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I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews changes in Virginia corporate and business
law from June 2001 through May 2002. Part II examines legisla-
tive changes in corporate and certain other business statutes
based on laws passed by the Virginia General Assembly during
its 2002 session. Part III reviews the major judicial decisions ad-
dressing corporate and business law issues and principles.
II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
During the 2002 session, the General Assembly enacted several
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pieces of legislation that will have varying degrees of impact on
Virginia corporate and business law. The most significant piece of
legislation establishes the Virginia Business Trust Act ("VBTA"), 1
which provides a statutory framework for the formation and op-
eration of Virginia business trusts. Although several changes
were made to statutes of governing public service corporations,
public utilities, banking and finance, and taxation, these changes
are not included in this review.
A. Corporations and Other Entities
1. Business Trusts
a. Introduction
With the adoption of the VBTA, the General Assembly estab-
lished a statutory framework under Virginia law for the forma-
tion and operation of a type of entity that has been used effec-
tively in a number of other states. A Virginia business trust is an
unincorporated, perpetual, limited liability legal entity that may
be formed to conduct any lawful business. The provisions of the
VBTA will become effective on October 1, 2003.2
The VBTA provides basic mechanisms for business trust for-
mation and internal governance. While the VBTA provides statu-
tory certainty and protection to business trusts and their trus-
tees, it also maximizes the flexibility of business trusts by
deferring most of the details of governance to the organizing
documents.3 In fact, the VBTA expressly states that "[t]his chap-
ter shall be construed in furtherance of the policies of giving
maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and of en-
forcing governing instruments."4 Because of the VBTA's flexibil-
ity, parties to a Virginia business trust can structure their par-
ticular transaction with the equivalent of a blank slate.
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1200 to -1284 (Cum. Supp. 2002). For an additional discus-
sion of this Act, see John V. Cogbill, III & D. Brennen Keene, Annual Survey of Virginia
Law: Real Estate and Land Use Law, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 271, 313 (2002).
2. Id. §§ 13.1-1201 to -1209 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
3. Id. §§ 13.1-1200 to -1284 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
4. Id. § 13.1-1282(B) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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Business trusts have often been the entity of choice for mutual
funds (usually Massachusetts or Delaware business trusts), real
estate investment trusts (often Maryland real estate investment
trusts), and mortgage and other finance entities that securitize
assets (often New York common law trusts). The VBTA offers
businesspersons and finance professionals an unincorporated,
perpetual, limited liability Virginia entity that may offer a
greater degree of flexibility than has previously been available in
Virginia.
b. Formation and General Filings
The technical provisions of the VBTA conform to the Virginia
Stock Corporation Act ("VSCA")' and the Virginia Limited Liabil-
ity Company Act ("VLLCA").6 A Virginia business trust is formed
when the articles of trust are signed and filed with the Virginia
State Corporation Commission ("Commission").7 Unless the arti-
cles of trust provide otherwise, the existence of a Virginia busi-
ness trust begins when the Commission issues a certificate of
trust.' The articles of trust must set forth the name and address
of the business trust and the name and address of the initial reg-
istered agent, and may set forth any other matter permitted un-
der the VBTA.9 An initial filing fee of $100 is payable to the
Commission,1" and an annual registration fee of $50 is due by
September 1 each year thereafter."
The name of a business trust must be distinguishable from the
name of any other business trust or other business entity regis-
tered or reserved under Virginia law and may not contain words
such as corporation, incorporated, limited liability company, or
limited partnership, among others.'2 The name may contain
words such as 'company,' 'association,' 'club,' 'foundation,' 'fund,'
'institute,' 'society,' 'union,' 'syndicate,' or 'trust,' or abbreviations
5. Id. § 13.1-601 to -781 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
6. Id. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
7. Id. § 13.1-1202 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
8. Id. § 13.1-1203(B) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
9. Id. § 13.1-1212(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
10. Id. § 13.1-1204(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
11. Id. § 13.1-1252(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
12. Id. § 13.1-1214(B)-(C) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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of like import."13 A Virginia business trust's registered agent
must be: (1) a resident of Virginia who is (a) an officer or trustee
of the business trust, (b) an officer, director, general partner,
member or manager of an entity that is a trustee of the business
trust, or (c) a member of the Virginia State Bar; or (2) a domestic
or foreign entity authorized to transact business 'in Virginia.14
Except to the extent otherwise provided in the articles of trust
or in the governing instrument of the business trust, "the sole
trustee or a majority of the trustees may amend [or restate] the
articles of trust" at any time by filing articles of amendment or
articles of restatement with the Commission." Articles of
amendment and restatement must include "[a] statement that
the amendment was adopted in accordance with the articles of
trust and the governing instrument of the business trust."6 If a
change in plans or mistake results in an erroneous filing with re-
spect to a name or address specified in the articles of trust, arti-
cles of correction may be filed at any time by a trustee or officer of
the business trust correcting such name or address. 7
Upon the winding up of the business trust, articles of cancella-
tion must be filed with the Commission. 8 Unless otherwise pro-
vided by the articles of trust, the articles of cancellation are effec-
tive when accepted by the Commission.19
c. Governing Instrument
Many provisions of the VBTA regulate a business trust's gov-
ernance only to the extent not addressed by the business trust's
articles of trust or governing instrument.2 ° A business trust's gov-
erning instrument may provide any details with respect to the
business trust's governance so long as such provisions are not in-
consistent with law or with the articles of trust.2 The VBTA
13. Id. § 13.1-1214(A).
14. Id. § 13.1-1220(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
15. Id. § 13.1-1216(A)-(B) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
16. Id. § 13.1-1216(B)(4).
17. Id. § 13.1-1213 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
18. Id. § 13.1-1238(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
19. Id. § 13.1-1238(B).
20. See, e.g., id. § 13.1-1236 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
21. Id. § 13.1-1219(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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therefore provides a great deal of flexibility with respect to a
business trust's internal governance.
d. Liabilities of Beneficial Owners
The VBTA permits beneficial owners or other persons to par-
ticipate in the management of the business trust without incur-
ring personal liability for its obligations because beneficial own-
ers of a business trust are afforded limited liability to the same
extent as shareholders of a Virginia corporation.22 In addition, the
VBTA provides that, unless otherwise provided by the governing
instrument, neither the possession of power to direct the trustees
nor the exercise of such power shall impose on a person trustee
status or any of the duties or liabilities pertaining to the business
trust.23
A business trust's assets are immune from creditors seeking to
enforce a claim against its beneficial owner.24 Unless otherwise
provided in the governing instrument, beneficial owners of a Vir-
ginia business trust have "an undivided beneficial interest in the
property of the business trust" and have no interest in specific
trust property.25 Further, a creditor of a beneficial owner does not
have the "right to obtain possession of, or otherwise exercise legal
or equitable remedies with respect to, the property of the busi-
ness trust" unless otherwise provided by the governing instru-
ment.26 Therefore, creditors of a beneficial owner of a Virginia
business trust may not seize business trust property to satisfy
claims against beneficial owners and may only reach property
that the beneficial owner could reach under the governing in-
strument.
e. Duties and Liabilities of Trustees
The VBTA also provides a great deal of flexibility with respect
to a trustee's role in the management of a business trust. Trus-
22. Id. § 13.1-1225 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
23. Id. § 13.1-1228(B) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
24. Id. § 13.1-1226(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
25. Id. § 13.1-1226(A)-(B)(1).
26. Id. § 13.1-1226(B)(2).
2002]
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tees are appointed in the manner provided by the business trust's
governing instrument, which will prescribe the trustees' duties,
rights, and powers, and may provide for one or more series of
trustees with different duties and powers. A trustee may be a
natural person or an entity, and may also be a beneficial owner.28
If a governing instrument does not provide otherwise, "the trus-
tees shall choose and supervise the officers and employees of the
business trust," and shall direct the management of the business
trust's business and affairs.29
With respect to trustee liability, the VBTA provides that the
standard of care of business trust trustees is the same as that re-
quired of directors of a Virginia corporation.3" The VBTA states
that, except as otherwise provided in the governing instrument, a
trustee is not personally liable to third parties when acting in his
capacity as trustee." In addition, a trustee's liability to the busi-
ness trust and its beneficial owners is limited to that of directors
or officers of a Virginia corporation, and may be further limited
by the articles of trust or governing instrument. 2 A business
trust may purchase insurance for and indemnify a trustee, and
such trustee is entitled to mandatory indemnification to the same
extent as a director of a Virginia corporation.33
f. "Series" of a Business Trust
A Virginia business trust, like its Delaware counterpart, may
create one or more series of beneficial interests whose obligations
may only be enforced against the assets of such series. 4 Separate
and distinct records must be maintained with respect to each se-
ries and the assets of such series must be held and accounted for
separately in order to be afforded separate liability.35
27. Id. §§ 13.1-1219(B), -1228(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
28. Id. § 13.1-1201 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
29. Id. § 13.1-1228(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
30. Id. § 13.1-1229(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
31. Id. § 13.1-1229(B).
32. Id. § 13.1-1229(C).
33. Id. § 13.1-1230 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
34. Id. § 13.1-1231(D) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
35. Id.
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The ability to create separate series within a business trust
may be particularly useful to registered investment companies,
which are often structured as a primary or master trust with sev-
eral series of sub-trusts. Such sub-trusts may have varying in-
vestment objectives and may reduce their expenses due to econo-
mies of scale attained by being part of a single investment
company.
g. Derivative Actions
The VBTA provides that a beneficial owner of a business trust
may bring a derivative action to the same extent, and in the same
manner, as a shareholder of a Virginia corporation.36 A beneficial
owner who is successful in prosecuting a derivative action is enti-
tled to reasonable attorney's fees if the court finds the proceeding
"resulted in a substantial benefit to the business trust."37 A busi-
ness trust that is successful in defending a derivative proceeding
is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees if the court finds the pro-
ceeding was not commenced or maintained in good faith.
3
"
h. Access to Reports and Records
A business trust must "keep minutes of all meetings of its
beneficial owners and trustees, [and] a record of all actions taken
by the beneficial owners or trustees without a meeting."39 A busi-
ness trust must also keep appropriate accounting records,4" a re-
cord of its beneficial owners and current trustees, 41 and copies of
its articles of trust and governing instrument.42 Further, a busi-
ness trust must keep records of "[a]ll written communications to
beneficial owners generally within the past three years.
43
Subject to certain limitations, a beneficial owner is entitled to
inspect and copy the above-mentioned records at the business
36. Id. § 13.1-1232 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
37. Id. § 13.1-1233(1) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
38. Id. § 13.1-1233(2).
39. Id. § 13.1-1278(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
40. Id. § 13.1-1278(B).
41. Id. § 13.1-1278(C).
42. Id. § 13.1-1278(E)(1)-(2).
43. Id. § 13.1-1278(E)(5).
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trust's principal office.4 4 The right of inspection granted by the
VBTA "may not be abolished or limited by [the] business trust's
articles of trust or governing instrument."4 5
i. Merger
Under the VBTA, a business trust may merge with or into an-
other entity by executing and filing articles of merger. 6 Unless
otherwise provided by the governing instrument, a merger must
be approved by an "affirmative vote of the trustees and the hold-
ers of two-thirds of the outstanding beneficial interests of [the]
business trust."4 7 A governing instrument or an agreement of
merger may provide for contractual dissenter's rights to beneficial
owners of the business trust in connection with a merger or a sale
of all or substantially all of the business trust's assets.48 This sug-
gests that absent such a provision, there will be no dissenter's
rights in connection with such a transaction.
j. Conversion
A domestic entity, other than a domestic business trust, may
convert into a Virginia business trust pursuant to a plan of entity
conversion and by filing articles of entity conversion with the
Commission.49 If the converting entity is a corporation, an af-
firmative vote by more than two-thirds of all shares entitled to
vote is required, unless the corporation's board of directors re-
quires a greater vote.5" If the converting entity is a limited liabil-
ity company, an affirmative vote by all of its members is required,
unless otherwise provided by the limited liability company's op-
erating agreement or articles of organization.5 ' If the converting
entity is a partnership or a limited partnership, an affirmative
44. Id. § 13.1-1279(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
45. Id. § 13.1-1279(D).
46. Id. § 13.1-1260 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
47. Id. § 13.1-1258(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002). Under the VSCA, a merger or share ex-
change must be approved by more than two-thirds of all shares entitled to vote on the mat-
ter. Id. § 13.1-718(E) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
48. Id. § 13.1-1263(6) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
49. Id. §§ 13.1-1272, -1275(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
50. Id. § 13.1-1274(A)(6) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
51. Id. § 13.1-1274(B).
[Vol. 37:1
CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW
vote by all of its partners is required, unless otherwise provided
by the partnership or limited partnership's partnership agree-
ment.52 If the converting entity is any other type of entity, a
unanimous affirmative vote by the authorized persons is re-




A foreign entity may become a Virginia business trust pursu-
ant to a plan of domestication by filing articles of domestication
with the Commission.54 Although the VBTA provides that such
domestication is permitted if the laws of the foreign jurisdiction
in which the foreign entity is formed authorize it to domesticate
in another jurisdiction, the domestication must nevertheless be
approved in the manner provided by the VBTA.55 A domesticated
entity retains its assets and liabilities as if the domestication did
not occur.56
If a Virginia business trust wishes to domesticate to a foreign
jurisdiction, the plan of domestication must be approved by the
sole trustee or a majority of the trustees, unless otherwise pro-
vided in the governing instrument.5 When a Virginia business
trust has approved a plan of domestication to a foreign jurisdic-




A business trust may be dissolved upon the occurrence of any of
the following events:
1. [a]t the time or on the happening of any events specified in writing
in the articles of trust or a governing instrument; 2. [ulpon the
52. Id. § 13.1-1274(C)-(D) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
53. Id. § 13.1-1274(E).
54. Id. §§ 13.1-1266, -1268(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
55. Id. § 13.1-1265 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
56. Id. § 13.1-1270(A)(1)-(2) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
57. Id. § 13.1-1267(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
58. Id. § 13.1-1269(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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unanimous written consent of the beneficial owners; 3. [tlhe entry of
a decree of judicial dissolution ... ; or 4. [a]utomatic cancellation of
its certificate [due to nonpayment of annual registration fees].59
Dissolution may occur under these conditions "[ulnless otherwise
provided in the articles of trust or in the governing instrument,
upon the dissolution of a business trust, the trustees may wind
up the business trust's affairs ...."'0 Distribution of the assets of
a business trust occurs in the following order:
1. [t]o creditors ... in satisfaction of liabilities of the business
trust ... ; 2. [u]nless otherwise provided in the articles of trust or the
governing instrument, to the beneficial owners and former beneficial
owners in satisfaction of liabilities for [previously declared but un-
paid distributions]; and 3. [u]nless otherwise provided in the articles
of trust or in the governing instrument, to the beneficial owners in
the proportions in which the beneficial owners share in distribu-
tions.
6 1
Once the winding up process is completed, the trustees must file
articles of cancellation with the Commission.62
m. Foreign Business Trusts
The VBTA provides that foreign business trusts must register
with the Commission before transacting business in Virginia. 63 A
foreign business trust's internal affairs are governed by the laws
of the jurisdiction in which the foreign business trust is organ-
ized, and its registration with the Commission may not be denied
because of a difference between the laws of the foreign business
trust's governing jurisdiction and the laws of Virginia.64
n. Existing Virginia Real Estate Investment Trusts
The VBTA repeals the Virginia Real Estate Investment Trust
Act ("REIT").65 After the effective date of the VBTA, Virginia real
59. Id. § 13.1-1234 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
60. Id. § 13.1-1236 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
61. Id. § 13.1-1237 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
62. Id. § 13.1-1238(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
63. Id. § 13.1-1242 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
64. Id. § 13.1-1241 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
65. Id. §§ 6.1-343 to -351 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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estate investment trusts formed under the REIT will be governed
by the VBTA, but existing rights and proceedings will not be af-
fected.66
2. Stock and Nonstock Corporations
a. Notice, Voting, and Written Consent by Electronic
Transmission
i. Notice
The 2002 General Assembly passed legislation permitting stock
and nonstock corporations to provide notice to their shareholders
or members by means of a form of "electronic transmission " " con-
sented to by the shareholder or the member to whom the notice is
given." A shareholder or member may revoke his or her consent
by delivering written notice to the corporation and such consent is
deemed revoked by the shareholder or member if (1) the corpora-
tion is unable to deliver two consecutive notices by electronic
transmission; and (2) such inability becomes known to the person
responsible for delivering the notice.69 The amendment provides,
however, that the inadvertent failure to treat the inability to de-
liver a notice as a revocation does not invalidate any meeting or
other action.7°
One of the most important aspects of this legislation is a corpo-
ration's ability to imply the consent of a shareholder or member
66. Id. § 13.1-1284 (Cum. Supp. 2002); see, e.g., id. § 55-106.4 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
67. An "electronic transmission" is "any form of communication, not directly involving
the physical transmission of paper, that creates a record that may be retained, retrieved
and reviewed by a recipient thereof and that may be directly reproduced in paper form by
such a recipient through an automated process." Id. §§ 13.1-603, -803 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
68. Id. §§ 13.1-610(H), -842(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2002). A 1999 amendment to the VSCA
provided that corporations with 300 or more record shareholders could give notice of an-
nual or special shareholders' meetings electronically to any shareholder who had author-
ized delivery of notice electronically. To be effective, the secretary of the corporation must
have received authorization from a shareholder permitting the use of electronic notice in
the form of "(i) a writing signed by the shareholder or (ii) [an electronic transmission] from
the shareholder ... [containing] information from which the secretary could determine
[that the electronic transmission] was authorized by the shareholder .. " Id. § 13.1-
658(G) (Repl. Vol. 1999) (repealed 2002). The 2002 amendment replaced this provision
with a more comprehensive provision for all corporations.
69. Id. §§ 13.1-610(H), -842(A)(3).
70. Id.
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to receiving notice by electronic transmission under certain cir-
cumstances, including (1) when the notice is directed to a facsim-
ile number or e-mail address at which the shareholder or member
has consented to receive notice; and (2) when the corporation
posts the notice on an Internet Web site and sends a separate no-
tice to the shareholder or member of the posting to the record ad-
dress of the shareholder or member or an address to which the
shareholder or member has consented to receiving notices.71 For
purposes of clause (2) such notice is effective upon the later of the
giving of the separate notice or the posting of the notice on the
Internet Web site.
This new legislation, combined with the interpretations of the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") regarding the use
of electronic media to deliver information required under the fed-
eral securities laws,73 will permit a Virginia public company to
provide notice to its security holders of annual or special meet-
ings and proxy solicitation materials electronically, thereby re-
ducing the costs associated with annual or special meetings. Un-
der the federal securities laws, public companies are generally
required to deliver a proxy statement to their security holders
when soliciting proxy voting authority." Under the interpreta-
tions of the SEC, a public company is permitted to deliver proxy
solicitation materials electronically, subject to certain require-
ments.75
The rules promulgated by the SEC also permit public compa-
nies subject to the proxy rules to deliver one proxy statement and
annual report to an address shared by multiple security holders if
the security holders consent to such delivery.76 This practice is
71. Id. § 13.1-610(H), -842(F). It should be noted that the amendment does not spec-
ify how a shareholder or member is to give his or her consent or when such consent is to be
given. Presumably, a shareholder or member could give his or her consent to the form of
electronic transmission or facsimile number or e-mail address to which such electronic
transmission may be given either by written notice or an electronic transmission to the
corporation. Regardless of how such consent is given, it should be given before the notice is
deemed given under given under section 13.1-610(H).
72. Id. §§ 13.1-610(H), -842(F).
73. Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, 60 Fed. Reg. 53,458 (Oct. 6, 1995).
74. The proxy rules apply to companies with a class of equity securities registered un-
der section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000). Further,
proxy rules apply to investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act
of 1940. Id. § 80a (2000).
75. Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, 60 Fed. Reg. at 53,458.
76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(e) (2002) (SEC Rule 14a-3(e)). A company may receive af-
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known as "householding." It remains unclear under current Vir-
ginia law whether a Virginia public company would be permitted
to "household" the notice of annual or special meeting of security
holders that generally accompanies the proxy solicitation materi-
als. As the SEC has recognized, "the requirements for security
holder meeting notices are governed by state law, rather than by
the [SEC]'s proxy rules, and [the householding rules] are not in-
tended to preempt state law."77 Virginia law states that "[a] cor-
poration shall notify shareholders of the date, time, and place of
each annual and special shareholders' meeting."" One could ar-
gue that this provision does not require notice be sent to each
shareholder at a particular address. Presumably, had the drafters
intended a separate notice be sent to each shareholder, they
would have so provided.79 The conservative approach would be for
a Virginia public company that chooses to, and receives consent
from its security holders to, send household proxy materials to in-
clude a notice of annual or special meeting for each security
holder at a particular address. Under the electronic notice legisla-
tion, however, a Virginia public company that chooses to post
such notice together with its proxy solicitation materials on an
Internet Web site, and provide a separate written notice of the
posting, must include a separate notice of the posting for each se-
curity holder at a particular address.8 0
Under this new legislation, notice of a regular or special meet-
ing of the board of directors of a stock or nonstock corporation
may also be given by a form of electronic transmission consented
to by the director.8' A director may revoke his or her consent by
delivering written notice to the corporation. 2 Such consent is
deemed revoked by the director if the corporation is unable to de-
liver two consecutive notices by electronic transmission and this
firmative written consent from security holders with respect to householding or it may im-
ply such consent if certain conditions are met. Id. § 240.14a-3(e)(1)(ii) (SEC Rule 14a-
3(e)(1)(ii)).
77. Delivery of Proxy Statements and Information Statements to Households, 2000
SEC LEXIS 2325 (Oct. 27, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 240) (effective thirty
days after publication in Federal Register).
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-658(A) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
79. Delaware law specifically provides that notice shall be given "to each shareholder
entitled to vote at such meeting." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 222(b) (2001).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-842(F) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
81. Id. §§ 13.1-686(C), -866(C) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
82. Id.
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inability becomes known to the person responsible for delivering
the notice.13 The inadvertent failure to treat an inability to de-
liver a notice as a revocation does not invalidate any meeting or
other action. 4 A director's consent may be implied under certain
circumstances, including (1) when the notice is directed to a fac-
simile number or electronic mail address at which the director
has consented to receive notice; and (2) when the corporation
posts the notice on an Internet Web site and sends a separate no-
tice of the posting to the director at an address to which the direc-
tor has consented to receiving notices.8 5 For purposes of clause (2),
such notice is effective upon the later of the giving of the separate
notice or the posting of the notice on the Internet Web site. 6
ii. Voting
The same legislation permits any vote of a corporation's share-
holders or members, if authorized by the board of directors, to be
taken by a ballot submitted by electronic consent by a share-
holder or member or by such shareholder's or member's proxy. 7
iii. Written Consent
The definition of "electronic transmission" includes a provision
that specifically recognizes the use of an electronic transmission
to satisfy the current VSCA 8 and Virginia Nonstock Corporation
Act ("VNCA")89 requirements that an action taken by written con-
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. Like the provisions permitting electronic transmission of notices to sharehold-
ers and members, the provisions permitting electronic transmission of notices to directors
do not address how and when the directors' consent is to be given. Use of Electronic Media
for Delivery Purposes, 60 Fed. Reg. 53,458 (Oct. 6, 1995).
86. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-686(C), -866(C) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
87. Id. §§ 13.1-664.1(E), -846(B) (Cum. Supp. 2002); see also id. § 13.1-647(A) (Repl.
Vol. 1999).
88. Id. §§ 13.1-601 to -800 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2002). The provisions re-
garding action taken by written consent by shareholders and directors of stock corpora-
tions are set forth in sections 13.1-657 and 13.1-685, respectively.
89. Id. §§ 13.1-801 to -980 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2002). The provisions re-
garding action taken by written consent by members and directors of nonstock corpora-
tions are set forth in sections 13.1-841 and 13.1-865, respectively.
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sent either by a corporation's shareholders, members, or board of
directors be "signed.
90
b. Articles of Amendment and Restatement
The 2002 General Assembly also adopted legislation amending
the current provisions of the VSCA and VNCA with respect to ar-
ticles of amendment and articles of restatement for stock and
nonstock corporations, respectively. Under this legislation, if a
corporation files articles of amendment with the Commission
with respect to an amendment to the corporation's articles of in-
corporation that did not require shareholder or member approval,
the articles of amendment must include an explanation of why
such approval was not required.9' In addition, the articles of
amendment filed by a nonstock corporation must state that the
amendment received the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of
the directors then in office.92
Articles of restatement filed by a corporation with respect to a
restatement of the corporation's articles of incorporation must
now include the name of the corporation immediately prior to the
restatement and the date of the restatement's adoption.93 In addi-
tion, if a corporation files articles of restatement that contain one
or more amendments to the corporation's articles of incorporation
that did not require shareholder or member approval, such arti-
cles of restatement must meet the amendment requirements dis-
cussed above.94
The amendments to the VSCA require that a foreign corpora-
tion state its name on an application for a certificate of authority
and, if it is prevented from using its name under the VSCA, des-
ignate a name that satisfies the requirements of the VSCA.9
90. Id. §§ 13.1-603, -803 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
91. Id. §§ 13.1-710(A)(5), -888(A)(4)(b) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
92. Id. § 13.1-888(A)(4)(b). The amendments to the VNCA also require an explanation
of why director and member approval of amendments adopted by the incorporators was
not required and that the amendment was approved by a majority of the incorporators. Id.
93. Id. §§ 13.1-711(D)(1)-(2), -889(D)(1)-(2) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
94. Id. §§ 13.1-711(D)(4), -889(D)(4).
95. Id. § 13.1-759(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2002); see id. § 13.1-762 (Repl. Vol. 1999) (stating
the requirements under the VSCA with respect to the name of a foreign corporation apply-
ing for a certificate of authority to transact business in Virginia).
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The new VNCA legislation also authorizes the amendment of
the articles of incorporation of a nonstock corporation by a major-
ity of the corporation's incorporators when its organization has
been completed but there are no directors or members.96
3. Limited Liability Companies and Professional Limited
Liability Companies
In 2002 the Virginia General Assembly enacted legislation
amending the Virginia Limited Liability Company Act
("VLLCA").97 These amendments provide that written consent
from a member or manager of a limited liability company
("L.L.C.") sent by electronic transmission satisfies the require-
ment that such written consent be signed.9" The legislation also
allows voting by managers of an L.L.C. by means of a proxy that
may be submitted by electronic transmission,99 and excludes
compensation distributions to managers and members from the
calculation of limits on the liability of managers and members in
proceedings brought by or in the right of the L.L.C. 00 The
amendments further provide that a member's rights to obtain
certain information regarding the L.L.C. may be restricted by the
L.L.C.'s original operating agreement or an amendment to the
original operating agreement adopted by all of the members in
accordance with the procedures of the operating agreement." 1
Additionally, this legislation allows a member to dissociate from
an L.L.C. by submitting a resignation notice only if resignation of
a member is provided for in the articles of organization or operat-
ing agreement, 10 2 and enables a court to appoint one or more liq-
uidating trustees to wind up an L.L.C.'s affairs in the event the
L.L.C. is judicially dissolved.0 3
Under a separate piece of legislation, the 2002 General Assem-
bly amended the VLLCA to require that a partnership or limited
partnership converting to an L.L.C. include in its articles of or-
96. Id. § 13.1-887.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
97. Id. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
98. Id. §§ 13.1-1022(E), -1024(I) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
99. Id. § 13.1-1024(I).
100. Id. § 13.1-1025(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
101. Id. § 13.1-1028(C) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
102. Id. § 13.1-1040.1(1) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
103. Id. § 13.1-1048(A)-(B) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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ganization the date and place of filing of the partnership's or lim-
ited partnership's organizational documents, if any.104 The new
legislation also requires that a foreign L.L.C. state its name on an
application for registration to transact business in Virginia and, if
it is prevented from using its name under the VLLCA, designate
a name that satisfies the requirements of the VLLCA.1°  These
amendments clarify that the Secretary of State or other official
having custody of a foreign L.L.C.'s records must authenticate the
organizational documents of the foreign L.L.C. to be included
with its application for registration.16 The General Assembly fur-
ther clarified that an L.L.C. must pay all fees, fines, penalties,
and interest owed to the Commission before the Commission may
file or issue any L.L.C. certificate referred to in the VLLCA.' °7 Fi-
nally, the legislation specifies that a professional L.L.C.'s inclu-
sion of the initials "P.L.C.," "PLC," "P.L.L.C.," "PLLC," the phrase
"professional limited liability company," or "a professional limited
liability company" at the end of its name will not be considered in
determining whether the proposed name of a professional L.L.C.
is available on the records of the Commission.'08
4. Limited Partnerships and Partnerships
In 2002, the Virginia General Assembly passed legislation
amending certain sections of the Virginia Revised Uniform Lim-
ited Partnership Act ("VRULPA") °9 and Virginia Uniform Part-
nership Act ("VUPA")."10 The amendments to the VRULPA re-
quire that certificates filed under the VRULPA include the name
and the capacity of the person executing the certificate."' The
amendments also conform the registration requirements for for-
eign limited partnerships seeking to do business in Virginia to
those of other foreign entities. 112 Under the amendments, a for-
eign limited partnership must include a name that satisfies the
104. Id. § 13.1-1010.1(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
105. Id. § 13.1-1052(1) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
106. Id. § 13.1-1052(6).
107. Id. § 13.1-1065 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
108. Id. § 13.1-1104 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
109. Id. §§ 50-73.1 to -73.78 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
110. Id. §§ 50-73.79 to -73.149 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
111. Id. § 50-73.15(B) (Repl. Vol. 2002).
112. Id. § 50-73.54 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
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requirements of the VRUPLA in its application for registration." 3
To have a name in compliance with the VRUPLA, a foreign lim-
ited partnership may add to its name the phrase "limited part-
nership" or "a limited partnership," the abbreviation "L.P.," or
"LP," or, in the case of a limited partnership that is also regis-
tered in Virginia as a foreign limited liability partnership,
"L.L.P.," or other word, abbreviation, or designation to bring its
name into compliance with the requirements of the VRULPA re-
garding registered L.L.P.s."' Finally, the amendments clarify
that a limited partnership must pay all fees, fines, penalties, and
interest owed to the Commission before the Commission files or
issues any limited partnership certificate referred to in the
VRULPA." 5
The amendments to the VUPA require that any statement filed
with the Commission includes the name and the capacity of the
person signing the statement."6 Additionally, they require that a
partnership statement of authority filed with the Commission in-
clude the name of the state where the partnership was formed." 7
Finally, the amendments provide that the Commission shall not
file a statement with respect to any domestic or foreign registered
L.L.P. until all required annual continuation reports have been
filed with the Commission."
5. Professional Corporations
The 2002 General Assembly passed legislation specifying that
the initials "P.C.," the phrase "professional corporation," or "a
professional corporation" at the end of a professional corporation's
name shall not be considered in determining whether the pro-
posed name is available on the records of the Commission." 9
113. Id. § 50-73.54(1).
114. Id. § 50-73.56 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
115. Id. § 50-73.70 (Repl. Vol. 2002).
116. Id. § 50-73.83(C) (Repl. Vol. 2002).
117. Id. § 50-73.93(A)(1)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2002).
118. Id. § 50-73.134(G) (Repl. Vol. 2002).
119. Id. § 13.1-544.1 (Cum. Supp. 2002).
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B. Commercial Law
In 2002, the Virginia General Assembly enacted several pieces
of legislation amending Article 9. These amendments permit a fi-
nancing statement filing office to provide certain information re-
garding financing statement filings by providing the requesting
person with a list of private record research service providers.
121
The new legislation also requires that an amendment or correc-
tion to a previously filed financing statement include the name
and address of the debtor,12 and eliminate the specific reference
to filing fees for public finance and manufactured housing trans-
actions.122
C. Electronic Commerce
In 2002, the Virginia General Assembly enacted legislation
amending the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
("UCITA"). 123 UCITA was initially adopted by the 2000 General
Assembly to regulate the transferability of a contractual interest
in a computer program. 124 Under UCITA, a provision prohibiting
the transfer of a contractual interest in a computer program is
enforceable, and a transfer made in violation of such a provision
is a breach of contract.125 Moreover, such transfer does not create
contractual rights in the transferee against the transferor.'26
Prior to the new legislation, UCITA provided an exception for
transfers made in connection with a merger, acquisition, or sale
of a subsidiary or affiliate when the transfer was made for speci-
fied reasons.127 The new legislation amended UCITA by removing
this exception. 28
120. Id. § 8.9A-523(d) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
121. Id. § 8.9A-516(b)(3)(B)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
122. Id. § 8.9A-525(a)-(b) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
123. Id. §§ 59.1-501.1 to -509.2 (Repl. Vol. 2001 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
124. Id. § 59.1-501.3 cmt. 2 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
125. Id. § 59.1-505.3(2) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
126. Id.
127. Id. § 59.1-505.3(2)(D).
128. Id.
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III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Federal Securities Laws Decisions
For the first time since Congress passed the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"),' 29 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia examined the
pleading standard for "scienter"13 ° in a lawsuit involving alleged
breaches of federal securities law. l"' In Arnlund v. Deloitte &
Touche, LLP,132 seven shareholders of Heilig Meyers Co., Inc.
("Heilig"), a Virginia corporation, asserted claims for securities
129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000).
130. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the United States Supreme
Court held that a private plaintiff who seeks damages under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder ("section 10(b)" & "Rule
10b-5") must allege that defendant acted with "scienter," defined as the "intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud." 424 U.S. at 193 n.12. An allegation of negligence, therefore, was
deemed to be insufficient to state a claim for securities fraud. Id. The Supreme Court,
however, did not decide whether pleading recklessness under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
was sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement. Id. At the same time, the Supreme
Court observed that recklessness "is considered to be a form of intentional conduct" in
some areas of the law. Id. Since Hochfelder, the appellate courts "that have addressed this
issue have accepted that some form of recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the element of
scienter in private securities fraud cases." Arnlund v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 199 F.
Supp. 2d 461, 470 (E.D. Va. 2002). Subsequently, there arose different standards, how-
ever, by which to measure the adequacy of allegations of scienter in securities fraud cases
among the different circuits. Id. The Second Circuit required the most stringent standard,
and the Ninth Circuit provided.for a more lenient standard. Id.
131. See Arnlund, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 465. In 1995, Congress passed the PSLRA as a
means to prevent strike suits and other abuses that had arisen in securities fraud litiga-
tion. See Id. at 471, 475 (citing In re Advanta, 180 F.3d 525, 531 (3d. Cir. 1999). Advanta
explained that:
The purpose of the Act was to restrict abuses in securities class-action litiga-
tion, including: (1) the practice of filing lawsuits against issuers of securities
in response to any significant change in stock price, regardless of defendants'
culpability; (2) the targeting of "deep pocket" defendants; (3) the abuse of the
discovery process to coerce settlement; and (4) manipulation of clients by
class action attorneys.
In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 531. The PSLRA requires a plaintiff to plead scienter
[i]n any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff may
recover money damages on proof that the defendant acted with a particular
state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission al-
leged to violate this chapter, state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000). The PSLRA provides that if a plaintiff does not meet this
requirement, a court may, on any defendant's motion, dismiss the complaint. Id. § 78u-
4(b)(3).
132. 199 F. Supp. 2d 461 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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fraud and common law fraud arising out of misrepresentations
and omissions alleged to have been made by Heilig's outside audi-
tor, Deloitte & Touche, LLP ("Deloitte").133 These alleged misrep-
resentations were made in connection with Heilig's Annual Re-
port issued on May 30, 2000, which included, among other things,
audited financial statements.134 Deloitte argued that the lawsuit
should be dismissed because the plaintiffs had failed to state a
claim under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended ("1934 Act") and Rule 10b-5, promulgated there-
under, and because the complaint failed to meet "the heightened
standard for pleading scienter that is created by [the] PSLRA."
135
In examining whether scienter had been adequately pleaded by
the plaintiffs under the PSLRA, the court found "that it [was] suf-
ficient to plead scienter by setting forth facts that constitute cir-
cumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior."136
The court also noted that it would determine the adequacy of the
scienter allegations by measuring them by the facts collectively
alleged in the complaint. 137 The court held that in this instance,
the totality of the facts alleged raised a strong inference of the
requisite state of mind based on conscious behavior. 13' The court,
therefore, denied Deloitte's motion to dismiss.13 9
Deloitte performed an audit of the financial statements of
Heilig for the fiscal year ending on February 29, 2000, that was
subsequently incorporated into Heilig's annual report on Form
10-K (the "Annual Report") issued on May 30, 2000.140 On March
22, 2000 Deloitte presented its unqualified audit report to Heilig's
Board of Directors ("Heilig Board").141 On May 29, 2000 the Heilig
Board approved the Annual Report and sent it to the SEC on May
30, 2000.142
The Annual Report included Deloitte's audit opinion represent-
ing "that (1) Deloitte had audited the [company's financial state-
133. Id. at 466.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 470.
136. Id. at 475.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 485.
139. Id. at 492.




UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ments]; (2) [Heilig's] financial statements 'present fairly, in all
material respects, the financial position' of [Heilig] as of February
29, 2000; and (3) the audit was in conformity with [generally ac-
cepted] accounting principles." Deloitte's opinion also stated
that Heilig "was solvent; that it had almost $535 million in
shareholder equity; and a book value of $8.81 per share" as of
February 29, 2000, and May 30, 2000.144 Plaintiffs also argued
that Deloitte knew that its unqualified opinion was to be used in
[Heilig's] Annual Report and that, as of May 30, 2000, when the An-
nual Report was issued, Deloitte knew that [Heilig] was not solvent;
that the shareholder equity was not $535 million; that the book
value was not $8.81 per share; and that the audited financial state-
ments did not in most material respects fairly present [Heilig's] fi-
nancial position either as of February 29, 2000, or as of May 30,
2000.'14
Further, the plaintiffs charged that based on the financial in-
formation that it was given and the prior discussions between
Deloitte and Heilig's management, "Deloitte knew, or should have
known" before the Annual Report was released, that the accuracy
of Heilig's financial statements was problematic "and that there
was material uncertainty about the ability of [Heilig] to continue
as a going concern."146 The plaintiffs also argued that Deloitte
knew, by May 30, that its audit opinion and Heilig's Annual Re-
port inaccurately portrayed Heilig's liquidity situation. 147 The
plaintiffs claimed Deloitte was informed of these misrepresenta-
tions by Heilig's chief financial officer at a Heilig board meeting
held on May 17, 2000. 41 In addition, the plaintiffs averred that
Deloitte was aware, before the Annual Report was issued, that
the company was positioning itself to seek protection under the
bankruptcy laws and that an investment banker was retained to
inquire into potential purchasers for Heilig. 149 The plaintiffs fur-
ther alleged that Deloitte knew of several other misrepresenta-
tions of material fact in the Annual Report.15°
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting the Amended Complaint, 127, 141).
146. Id. (quoting the Amended Complaint, 27).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 466-67.
150. Id. at 467.
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On November 27, Heilig filed its quarterly report with the
SEC.151 The quarterly report revealed that by August 31, 2000,
Heilig was in dire straits and that "the equity interests of the
Company's shareholders may have no value."152 The plaintiffs'
lawsuit followed.153
As an initial matter, the court examined whether the plaintiffs
had standing to bring the lawsuit.'54 The court noted that
private claims under [slection 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule [10b-5]
may be brought only by persons who sold or purchased stock after the
date of an alleged misrepresentation, and that claims by persons al-
leging that they were fraudulently induced not to sell their shares
are legally insufficient in most instances.
155
Based on this standard, five plaintiffs who had purchased shares
of Heilig stock prior to the dissemination of the Annual Report
were dismissed totally from the case. 6
The court also examined Deloitte's motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim. 57 The court first noted that to satisfy the plead-
ing requirements applicable to section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and
Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, "a plaintiff must allege that:
(1) a defendant made a false statement or omitted to make a
statement of material fact"; (2) the false statement or omission
was made with scienter; (3) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the
false statement or omission; and (4) the false statement or omis-
sion "proximately caused the plaintiffs damages. " '
In order to determine whether this requirement was met, the
court first examined the requirements of the PSLRA.159 The court




154. Id. at 469.
155. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 730 (1975); Gurley v. Documation, Inc., 674 F.2d 253, 255-56 (4th Cir. 1982); Birn-
baum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952)).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 468.
158. Id. at 469 (citing In re Microstrategy, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 620, 628 (E.D. Va.
2000)). The language derives from Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 613 (4th Cir.
1999). Accord Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 208 (4th Cir.
1994); Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471, 476 (4th Cir. 1994).
159. Arnlund, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 470.
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it never defined that standard.16 ° The court reasoned, however,
that "the PSLRA did not change the nature and degree of scienter
that a plaintiff must prove to prevail in a securities fraud case,
but instead only changed what a plaintiff must plead in the com-
plaint in order to survive a motion to dismiss." '161 The court then
looked to the Fourth Circuit for guidance. The court noted that in
Phillips v. LCI International, Inc.,162 the Fourth Circuit held that
a plaintiff may establish scienter by proving that the defendant
acted recklessly, as this demonstrates the requisite intent.'63 The
Arnlund court noted, however, that the Fourth Circuit had "not
yet determined which pleading standard best effectuates Con-
gress's intent."1
64
After conducting an exhaustive review of a number of circuit
court decisions to identify what is required to plead scienter ade-
quately under the PSLRA,165 the court determined that a plaintiff
may "plead scienter by setting forth facts that constitute circum-
stantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior . ".."166
Further, a court should measure the adequacy of the scienter al-
legations "by the facts collectively alleged in the complaint."'67 In
this instance, the court held that
a plaintiff can satisfy the heightened burden of pleading scienter un-
der the PSLRA by identifying specific facts and circumstances avail-
able to the auditor that are unusual, suspicious or that, for other
reasons, would put the auditor on notice of matters that ought to be
looked into or reported on because, if true, they could alter an audi-
tor's opinion or foreclose it entirely, and by alleging that these facts
160. Id. at 471; see also Phillips, 190 F.3d at 620-21 (examining the circuit court inter-
pretation of PSLRA). There remains widespread disagreement among courts as to what
constitutes the proper pleading of "scienter" under the PSLRA. Id.
161. Arnlund, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 471; see, e.g., In re Glenayre Techs. Inc. Sec. Litig.,
982 F. Supp. 294, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
162. 190 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 1999).
163. Id. at 620; see also In re Comshare, 183 F.3d 542, 548-49 (6th Cir. 1999).
164. Arnlund, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 474 (citing Phillips, 190 F.3d at 621).
165. Id. at 473-74. Compare the Second Circuit's standard requiring a plaintiff to al-
lege facts showing either (1) a defendant's "motive and opportunity" to commit fraud; or (2)
strong circumstantial evidence of conscious or reckless behavior, Shields v. Citytrust Ban-
corp., Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994), with the Ninth Circuit's standard that does
not require a plaintiff to allege any specific facts to survive a motion to dismiss and merely
requires a plaintiff to make general allegations of scienter, In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir. 1994).
166. Arnlund, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 475 (citing In re Microstrategy, 115 F. Supp. 2d 620,
628-30, 633 (E.D. Va. 2000)).
167. Id.
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were ignored, either deliberately, recklessly or by failing to follow
generally accepted accounting and auditing principles.
168
The court stated that "'[i]f the totality of the circumstances al-
leged raises a "strong inference" of the requisite state of mind, it
is immaterial whether plaintiffs satisfy their burden by "pleading
motive and opportunity, conscious misbehavior, recklessness, or
by impressing upon the Court a novel legal theory."''169 Further,
the court found that if one alleges reckless rather than willful
conduct, the conduct must meet the Phillips standard.17 °
Applying the court's legal analysis to the facts in Arnlund, the
court held that "the totality of the factors alleged raise[d] a strong
inference of the requisite state of mind based on conscious behav-
ior under any of the standards of recklessness promulgated by the
various circuit courts."1"1 Specifically, the court agreed with the
plaintiffs that "Deloitte's involvement and participation was inte-
gral to the creation of all [Heilig's] SEC filings."172 The court also
recognized the plaintiffs' contention that Deloitte worked closely
with management and key executives of Heilig for many years
and had unrestricted access to Heilig's employees, management,
books, and records. 73 The court further noted that Deloitte's un-
fettered access to Heilig was not offered solely by the Plaintiffs
"as the requisite strong inference of scienter," but was used "as
part of the context to support the particulars of scienter set forth
in the other allegations" of the case. 74 Based on these facts, the
court inferred that Deloitte was positioned to understand the sig-
nificance of both events that had transpired, or that were occur-
ring in, the fiscal year being audited.'75 The court found that,
"from the kind of tasks Deloitte is said to have engaged in, the
concert of activity with executive management.., and the re-
sponsibility of an auditor, it [was] inferable that Deloitte either
168. Id. (citing In re SmarTalk, 124 F. Supp. 2d 505, 513-14 (S.D. Ohio 2000)).
169. Id. at 476 (quoting Microstrategy, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 631).
170. Id. at 475. In Phillips, the Fourth Circuit defined "recklessness" under section
10(b) as "an act so highly unreasonable and such an extreme departure from the standard
of ordinary care as to present a danger of misleading the plaintiff to the extent that the
danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have
been aware of it." Phillips v. LCI Int'l. Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 621 (4th Cir. 1999).
171. Arnlund, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
172. Id. at 477.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 477-78.
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knew of the deterioration of [Heilig's] finances ... or with great
recklessness ignored it."'1 76 The court went on to point out that
"those inferences [were] underscored by the specifically alleged
access to, and discussions with, [Heilig's] management and its
Board of Directors about facts that were highly pertinent to [its]
financial affairs and its viability as a going concern as of May
30."177
The court found that such allegations were vital to establishing
scienter because Deloitte played an important role in assisting
Heilig prepare for bankruptcy and was aware of Heilig's liquidity
and credit concerns, in addition to having access to and being in-
timately familiar with the finances of Heilig.17' Based on this
analysis, the court found that the plaintiffs adequately alleged
both the actual knowledge and recklessness necessary to proceed
under the PSLRA as analyzed by the Fourth Circuit in Phillips
and therefore denied Deloitte's motion to dismiss.179
B. Supreme Court of Virginia Decisions
1. Flippo v. CSC Associates8 °
In Flippo, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld a trial court's
judgment holding one L.L.C. member liable for a breach of fiduci-
ary duty to the L.L.C., barring two members of the L.L.C. from
serving as managers of the company, awarding compensatory and
punitive damages, and imposing sanctions under Virginia Code
section 8.01-271.1.181
The case concerned the ownership of timberlands by descen-
dents of T. Frank Flippo."8 ' On Mr. Flippo's death, the timber-
lands were devised to his three children, Arthur P. Flippo,
F. Carter Flippo and Lucy Flippo Wisely."8 3 Carter Flippo man-
176. Id. at 478.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 478-79.
179. Id. at 485.
180. 262 Va. 48, 547 S.E.2d 216 (2001).
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aged the timberlands in his capacity as executor of the estate." 4
Lucy Flippo Wisely, however, transferred her interest to her
three children, who maintained their interests in the name of
CSC Associates, a general partnership."8 5 In 1988, Carter Flippo
and Arthur Flippo ("Flippos"), and CSC Associates established
the Flippo Land & Timber Company Partnership ("Flippo Part-
nership"), which served as owner and operator of the business."8 '
The Flippos and CSC Associates later held discussions concern-
ing amendments to the partnership agreement that would ad-
dress issues of partner withdrawal or death that were not covered
in the existing agreement.8 ' Subsequently, they drafted-but
never executed" 8-a restated partnership agreement with spe-
cific provisions dealing with the purchase of a member's shares by
the remaining members upon such member's death or withdrawal
from the partnership."8 9
In 1995, the Flippos allowed CSC Associates to hold its interest
in Flippo partnership as CSC Associates III, L.L.C. ("CSC"), a
limited liability company. 9 ' Additionally, the Flippos and CSC
converted the Flippo Land & Timber Company Partnership into a
limited liability company, Flippo Land & Timber Co., L.L.C.
("FLTC").191 Carter Flippo was the manager of FLTC, and CSC
and the Flippos were its members.' 92
In 1997, the Flippos looked for a mechanism by which they
could retain their interests in FLTC for the purpose of estate
planning. 193 CSC rejected the Flippos' requests to hold their FLTC
interests through personal L.L.C.s.' 94 Carter Flippo then con-
ferred with a firm that was both his personal counsel and FLTC's
outside counsel regarding other mechanisms to achieve their es-
tate planning goals.1 95 The legal counsel advised Carter Flippo to
184. Id. at 53, 547 S.E.2d at 219-20.
185. Id. at 53, 547 S.E.2d at 220.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 53-54, 547 S.E.2d at 220.
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form a joint venture between FLTC and a newly formed company,
Flippo Lumber Corporation.196 Carter Flippo, as manager of
FLTC, could transfer its assets to Flippo Lumber Corporation, re-
sulting in the dissolution of FLTC pursuant to the terms of
FLTC's operating agreement. 19 7 The legal counsel also advised the
Flippos that L.L.C.s could hold their interests in the joint venture
without CSC's approval under FLTC's operating agreement.'98
In October 1998, Carter Flippo wrote a letter informing CSC
that, as FLTC's manager, he accepted Flippo Lumber Corpora-
tion's proposal for FLTC to enter a joint venture and convey all of
FLTC's property to the new venture, Timber Enterprises,
L.L.C.'99 Further, the letter informed CSC that FLTC had "dis-
solved" pursuant to the terms of the operating agreement "be-
cause FLTC had contributed all of its non-cash assets to Timber
Enterprises."200 CSC was given the option to join Timber Enter-
prises if CSC agreed to the terms of the new venture's operating
agreement.2"'
CSC then filed a bill of complaint against Carter Flippo, Arthur
Flippo, FLTC, Flippo Lumber Corporation, and Timber Enter-
prises, individually and derivatively on behalf of FLTC, which
sought to: (1) recover FLTC's assets; (2) remove Carter Flippo as
manager of FLTC; (3) prevent future efforts to dissolve FLTC or
dispose of its assets; and (4) recover compensatory and punitive
damages resulting from a breach of fiduciary duties by the Flip-
pos.
20 2
The Flippos separately filed an amended bill of complaint
which sought the dissolution of FLTC and the distribution of the
assets in kind on three alternative bases:2 3 (1) judicial dissolution
pursuant to Virginia Code section 13.1-1047, under the theory
that "it was not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of
FLTC"; (2) reform of Article 13 of FLTC's operating agreement







202. Id. at 54-55, 547 S.E.2d at 220.
203. Id. at 55, 547 S.E.2d at 220.
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agreement based on CSC's alleged fraud in the inducement."2 °4
The Flippos also submitted "contingent resignations" that would
operate should the trial court determine that Article 13 of FLTC's
operating agreement allowed a member to resign under that Arti-
cle and receive an in kind distribution of the member's share of
the assets.20 5 CSC then filed a motion for sanctions on the
grounds that the Flippos' allegations of mutual mistake were not
well grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification or reversal of the exist-
ing law.20 6
At trial, the court held that Carter Flippo, assisted by Arthur
Flippo in forming Timber Enterprises and in transferring FLTC's
assets to that company, breached his fiduciary duties to FLTC
and violated its operating agreement.7 The court awarded attor-
neys' fees to CSC for prosecuting the action on behalf of FLTC,
and also awarded compensatory and punitive damages of
$12,860.64 and $350,000.00, respectively, against Carter
Flippo. 2°' The court also made CSC manager of FLTC and prohib-
ited such service by the Flippos. °9 Further, the court denied the
Flippos' request for dissolution of FLTC and for reformation or
rescission of FLTC's operating agreement, 210 and therefore also
rejected the Flippos' contingent resignations.2 1 Finally, the court
granted CSC's motion for sanctions, awarding additional attor-
neys' fees to CSC.
21 2
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia first examined the
Flippos' claim that Carter Flippo should be protected from liabil-
ity for breach of fiduciary duty to the limited liability company
under Virginia Code section 13.1-1024.1(B). 23 This section pro-
vides that a manager may rely on "information, opinions, reports
or statements" if they are prepared or presented by certain ex-
perts, including legal counsel and public accountants, unless such
204. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1047 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
205. Flippo, 262 Va. at 55, 547 S.E.2d at 220-21.







213. See id. at 56-58, 547 S.E.2d at 221-22.
20021
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
reliance is unwarranted.214 In order to be afforded the protection
of Virginia Code section 13.1-1024.1(B), however, a manager must
have "received and acted upon... [the] advice sought in good
faith for the benefit of the company.""21 The court explained that
"[a] manager, like a corporate director, is required to discharge
his duties in accordance with his 'good faith business judgment of
the best interests of the limited liability company."'216 Both Vir-
ginia Code section 13.1-690(B) and section 13.1-1024.1(B) provide
protection to managers and corporate directors from liability "in
the exercise of their good faith business judgment."217 The court
found that a corporate director is entitled to liability protection
under Virginia Code section 13.1-690(B) only when the acts re-
lated to the exercise of business judgment on behalf of the corpo-
ration of which he or she was the director,218 and concluded that
the same analysis must also apply to section 13.1-1024.1(B).219
Because the legal advice sought by Carter Flippo was not related
to the business interest of FLTC, such advice was not afforded the
protections of section 13.1-1024.1(B). 2 ° It made no difference that
the advice upon which the Carter Flippo acted involved acts that
could legally be taken by him as manager of FLTC. 221 As the court
stated:
Even if legal, the action was neither sought nor taken with the in-
tent of benefiting FLTC and in fact, had an adverse impact on the
company. Following such advice cannot be the basis for a defense
under subsection(B) of Code § 13.1-1024.1 to a violation of subsection
(A) of that section.222
Turning its attention to punitive damages, the court held that
the trial court's. award of $350,000 against Carter Flippo was not
214. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1024.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
215. Flippo, 262 Va. at 57, 547 S.E.2d at 222.
216. Id. at 56, 547 S.E.2d at 221 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1024.1(A) (Repl. Vol.1999 & Cum. Supp. 2002)); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum.
Supp. 2002) (requiring directors to act with good faith business judgment).
217. Flippo, 262 Va. at 57, 547 S.E.2d at 221; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(B)
(Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2002) (outlining the circumstances in which a director is
entitled to rely on outside information); id. § 13.1-1024.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp.
2002) (prescribing the same standards for managers).
218. Flippo, 262 Va. at 57, 547 S.E.2d at 222 (citing Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561,
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in error because the Flippos had "acted in conscious disregard of
the interests of FLTC and CSC. '223 As the court stated:
[Tihe trial court found that the Flippos "weren't going [to the counsel
involved] asking for advice as to what is in the best interest of
[FLTC], they were asking what was the best way to break [FLTC] af-
ter the younger members of the organization, CSC, had not done
what they wanted them to do." This action, as characterized by the
trial court, was "secretive, concealed, dishonest" and "an attempt to
steal property worth millions of dollars." Punitive damages were as-
sessed "because of that clearly dishonest conduct."
224
In addition the court found that it made no difference that the
"scheme" was devised by their counsel nor that their counsel had
a conflict of interest by representing both FLTC and the Flippos
because it did not alter the reasoning for the "scheme;" namely
"the Flippos' desire to implement their estate planning goals re-
gardless of the interests of FLTC and CSC and any duties they
owed to those entities.' '225
Next, the court examined the trial court's ruling that removed
Carter Flippo as manager of FLTC, disqualified Arthur Flippo
from being manager of FLTC, and installed CSC as manager of
FLTC.226 The court held that because the trial court found that
"the Flippos had breached their fiduciary duties to FLTC and vio-
lated [FLTC's] operating agreement in doing so," Virginia Code
section 13.1-1023(C)(1) authorized it to "enforce an operating
agreement by relief 'that the court in its discretion determines to
be fair and appropriate.' 27 The court continued by noting that
whether the enforcement of FLTC's operating agreement by the
trial court was "fair and appropriate" was an appealable issue,
but the initial decision was fully within the purview of the trial
court to consider.228
One final area that should be highlighted is the court's discus-
sion of sanctions pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1.229
223. Id. at 60, 547 S.E.2d at 223.
224. Id. at 59, 547 S.E.2d at 223.
225. Id. at 60, 547 S.E.2d at 223.
226. Id. at 60, 547 S.E.2d at 224.
227. See id. at 61, 547 S.E.2d at 224 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1023(C)(1) (Repl.
Vol. 1999)).
228. Id. at 61-62, 547 S.E.2d at 224.
229. See id. at 65-67, 547 S.E.2d at 227-28; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Repl. Vol.
2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
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The trial court granted CSC's motion for sanctions based on the
allegations of mutual mistake and fraud in the Flippos' amended
bill of complaint. 3 ' The Flippos objected to the sanctions, arguing
that the trial court's finding did not support the sanctions and
that "the Flippos' theories of recovery were well grounded in fact
and in law."231 In applying an abuse of discretion standard, the
court
use[d] an objective standard of reasonableness in determining
whether a litigant and his attorney, after reasonable inquiry, could
have formed a reasonable belief that the pleading was well grounded
in fact, warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and not inter-
posed for an improper purpose. 232
The Flippos based their fraud allegation on a letter from CSC to
both legal counsel and the Flippos, in which CSC's proposed
changes to the draft of FLTC's operating agreement were charac-
terized as "housekeeping" items.233 The Flippos contended that
the proposed changes were, in actuality, material.234 In particu-
lar, the letter stated "[w]e 'have had our attorney review the
document and some "oversights" and housekeeping items have
been added (as shown). I would hope these are just housekeeping
items and have no material affect [sic] on the agreement. Please
let me know if any of these are not acceptable.' 235
In upholding the trial court's award of sanctions, the court
noted that the clear language of the letter stated an opinion of the
writer, and "[fIraud cannot be predicated upon the mere expres-
sion of an opinion."2 36 The court also found that there was no in-
tent to mislead-a prerequisite to a finding of fraud-because the
letter invited the Flippos "to consider the impact of the suggested
changes. '237 The court, referring to the record of the trial court,
stated that .'.[e]verything done by CSC... was above board, high-
230. Flippo, 262 Va. at 65, 547 S.E.2d at 227.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 65-66, 547 S.E.2d at 227 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000
& Cum. Supp. 2002)).
233. Id. at 66, 547 S.E.2d at 227.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. (citing Tate v. Colony House Builders, Inc., 257 Va. 78, 82, 508 S.E.2d 597, 599
(1999)).
237. Id. at 66-67, 547 S.E.2d at 227.
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lighted in red, done in writing. And to try to say that... [CSC]
could mislead a sophisticated law firm or sophisticated attorneys
who specialize in this type of work, and that [it] succeeded in do-
ing that, is ridiculous.' 238
Flippo highlights why it is critically important for a manager of
a Virginia L.L.C. to act in the best interests of the company if the
manager wishes to avail himself or herself of the protections af-
forded under Virginia Code section 13.1-1024.1(B). Merely relying
on the advice of outside counsel will not shield a manager from
liability if the manager cannot prove that the advice sought was
for the company's benefit.
2. Willard v. Moneta 239
In Willard, the Supreme Court of Virginia examined whether a
dissenter's loss of the right to demand payment for shares of stock
constituted an injury to property, which would make it subject to
the applicable five-year statute of limitations, or a personal in-
jury, which was subject to a two-year statute of limitations.24 ° In
holding that the loss of dissenters' rights was an injury to prop-
erty subject to the applicable five-year statute of limitations,241
the court was able to take a second bite of the Moneta apple.242
Willard previously filed a derivative suit on behalf of Moneta
Building Supply, Inc. ("Moneta") and its shareholders against
Moneta and its directors and officers, on the grounds that a sale
of Moneta's assets to another company involved a conflict of in-
terest in violation of Virginia Code section 13.1-691.243 In dismiss-
ing this claim, the court held that a director discharges his/her fi-
duciary duties by acting "in accordance with his/her good faith
business judgment of what is in the best interests of the corpora-
tion."244 If a director acts in accordance with this standard, the
238. Id. at 67, 547 S.E.2d at 227.
239. 262 Va. 473, 551 S.E.2d 596 (2001) [hereinafter Willard II].
240. Id. at 476, 551 S.E.2d at 596. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(B) (Repl. Vol.
2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002), with id. § 8.01-248 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
241. Willard 11, 262 Va. at 483, 551 S.E.2d at 600.
242. See Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc., 258 Va. 140, 515 S.E.2d 277 (1999)
[hereinafter Willard I].
243. Id. at 148, 515 S.E.2d at 282; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691 (Repl. Vol. 1999 &
Cum. Supp. 2002) (prescribing general standards of conduct for directors).
244. Willard 1, 258 Va. at 151, 515 S.E.2d at 284.
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court reasoned, Virginia Code section 13.1-690(C) "provides a
'safe harbor' that shields a director from liability for any action
taken as a director, and for failure to take action." '245 Because the
court found that the directors acted in accordance with VirginiaCode section 13.1-690(A), such directors were entitled to the safeharbor protection of subpart (C) of the section.246 The court, there-
fore, dismissed the case.247
On November 15, 1996, A.S. Cappellari ("A.S.") and Rose MaryCappellari ("Rose Mary"), the officers, directors, and shareholders
of Moneta, entered into a contract on behalf of Moneta to sell sub-
stantially all of its assets to Capps Home and Building Center,Inc. ("Capps").248 Capps was controlled by David Cappellari("David"), a shareholder of Moneta and the son of A.S. and Rose
Mary.
249
Ronald L. Willard ("Willard"), a shareholder of Moneta,brought suit in order to void the sale of Moneta's assets to Capps,
alleging that the transaction involved a conflict of interest in vio-lation of Virginia Code section 13.1-691.25 0 When that lawsuit
failed, Willard then filed the case at issue against Moneta seeking
monetary damages for the alleged injury to Willard's property.251
Willard's basis for this allegation was that, as a shareholder ofMoneta, he was entitled to dissenters' rights with respect to the
proposed transaction as set forth in Virginia Code section 13.1-
730.252 Willard claimed, however, that the notice of the special
meeting of the shareholders on the proposed sale of substantially
all of Moneta's assets to Capps did not contain any notice of such
dissenters' rights. 3
The special meeting of Moneta's shareholders to vote on theproposed sale took place on December 20, 1996. Although Willard
voted against the sale and made a competing offer at a higher
245. Id. at 151, 515 S.E.2d at 284 (citing Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r v. Matyiko,
353 Va. 1, 6, 481 S.E.2d 468, 470 (1997)).
246. Id. at 153, 515 S.E.2d at 286-87.
247. See id.




252. See id. at 478, 551 S.E.2d at 597-98; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-730 (Repl. Vol.1999 & Cum. Supp. 2002) (outlining the shareholder's right to dissent).
253. Willard 11, 262 Va. at 478, 551 S.E.2d at 597.
CORPORATE AND BUSINESS LAW
price than Capps's, the votes of A.S. and Rose Mary were suffi-
cient to approve the sale to Capps.254 In January 1997 the trans-
action closed, and Moneta ceased conducting business.5
The trial court issued its opinion in April 2000 and sustained
Moneta's plea of the running of the statute of limitations, dis-
missing Willard's motion for judgment.256 Specifically, the trial
court held that "Willard's motion for judgment was not an action
for injury to property that entitled him to the benefit of the five-
year limitation period set forth in [Virginia] Code § 8.01-
243(B). 257 Instead, the court held that Willard's motion for judg-
ment was barred by the two-year limitation in Virginia Code sec-
tion 8.01-248 because the deprivation of his dissenters' right was
a personal injury.
The issue for the Supreme Court of Virginia, therefore, was
whether the motion for judgment filed by Willard was an "action
for injury to property" under Code § 8.01-243(B), thereby gov-
erned by the five-year statute of limitation period. Otherwise, the
catch-all provisions of Code §8.01-248 would apply and Willard's
action would be time-barred by the two-year limitation.259
The court held that "dissenters' rights are property interests
and that allegations of loss of dissenters' rights constitute an al-
legation of 'injury to property' within the meaning of Code § 8.01-
243(B)."26° As the court stated:
Ownership of stock provides the shareholder with a bundle of rights,
some of which are provided by contract while others are provided by
the Code. Some rights may be unique to certain classes of stock,
while other rights exist in all stock, independent of class. We have
previously stated, for example, that the right to vote shares of stock
at a corporate meeting is an incident of ownership; it is a part of the
stockholder's property interest. Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life
Ins. Co., 111 Va. 1, 27, 68 S.E. 412, 421 (1910). In Fein v. Lanston
Monotype Mach. Co., 196 Va. 753, 767, 85 S.E.2d 353, 361 (1955), we
held that "[t]he right to vote for directors is a right to protect prop-




258. Id; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-248 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
259. Willard 11, 262 Va. at 478, 551 S.E.2d at 598.
260. Id. at 481, 551 S.E.2d at 599; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243 (Repl. Vol. 2000 &
Cum. Supp. 2002).
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erty from loss, and to make its possession beneficial. To deprive a
stockholder of his right to vote is to deprive him of an essential at-
tribute of his property."
261
Similarly, the court ruled that Virginia Code section 13.1-
730(A)(3) "gives a shareholder a right incident to ownership of
stock," which is further described as "the right to dissent from
certain corporate actions."262 The court stated that "the presence
of dissenters' rights triggers a series of rights and obligations un-
der the Code that ultimately provides the shareholder the oppor-
tunity to demand the fair value of his shares."263 The court rea-
soned, therefore, that a share of stock with such rights may be
more valuable than one without such rights. 264 As a result, the
loss of such rights injures the stock, regardless of how it occurs.265
Accordingly, the court ruled that Moneta's alleged failure to
provide proper notice of dissenters' rights could be properly char-
acterized as "conduct directed at Willard's property. '266 The court
reasoned that a director's loss of the right to vote constitutes an
injury to property, and therefore the same analysis should apply
to a dissenting shareholder's loss of the right to demand fair
value. 267 Because the applicable statute of limitations is deter-
mined by the type of injury alleged, the court stated that
Willard's loss of dissenters' rights was the alleged injury, not
Moneta's failure to give Willard notice.26' The court concluded,
therefore, that "[w]hether the alleged failure to give Willard no-
tice of dissenters' rights in accordance with Code § 13.1-732
caused injury or loss is a different question" for another day.269
3. Commonwealth of Virginia v. JOCO Foundation270
In Commonwealth of Virginia v. JOCO Foundation, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia examined whether a circuit court's sub-






267. Id. at 481-82, 551 S.E.2d at 600.
268. Id. at 482, 551 S.E.2d at 600.
269. See id.
270. 263 Va. 151, 558 S.E.2d 280 (2002).
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ject matter jurisdiction extends to suits instituted by the Attorney
General of Virginia against Virginia corporations that are duly
established by the State Corporation Commission (the "Commis-
sion") under the VNCA.271 At issue was whether the Commission
was the proper forum for the suit, or whether the Attorney Gen-
eral could proceed in the circuit court "under some 'inherent
power' of the circuit court or under the common law" in order to
obtain the relief sought.27 2 In a four to three split decision, the
court rejected the Attorney General's suit, holding that the circuit
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the issues raised in
the suit.27
3
JOCO Foundation ("JOCO") was a Virginia non-stock corpora-
tion formed to benefit community organizations and created un-
der the will of Reid Jones, Jr., a philanthropist from Moneta, Vir-
ginia.2 " The suit alleged that the defendants, who were the
directors of JOCO, had breached their fiduciary duties owed to
the corporation to the detriment of the intended beneficiaries of
JOCO.275 The Attorney General sought, inter alia, removal of the
defendants as directors of JOCO, and appointment of a receiver to
preserve the assets of the corporation. 276 The trial court ruled in a
May 2001 order
"that it lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction over the Commonwealth's
claims seeking appointment of a receiver and a preliminary injunc-
tion" against corporate directors "because the Commonwealth's ex-
clusive remedy to address alleged breaches of fiduciary duties owed
by these ... directors" is set forth in Title 13.1 of the Code of Vir-
ginia, "which gives exclusive jurisdiction to the State Corporation
• • ,,277
Commission.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Attorney Gen-
eral argued that the circuit court has the authority to consider
claims brought by the Commonwealth against directors of a
charitable foundation organized as a nonstock corporation that
allege that the directors have breached fiduciary duties, engaged
271. Id. at 154-55, 558 S.E.2d at 280.
272. Id. at 155, 558 S.E.2d at 281.
273. Id. at 165, 558 S.E.2d at 287.
274. Id. at 155, 558 S.E.2d at 281.
275. Id. at 156, 558 S.E.2d at 281.
276. Id. at 157, 558 S.E.2d at 282.
277. Id. at 158, 558 S.E.2d at 283.
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in acts of self dealing, and wasted foundation assets. 78 While ac-
knowledging that "generally only members or shareholders of a
corporation have standing to challenge internal management de-
cisions of a corporation," the Attorney General argued that the
rule does not apply "'where the Corporation is also a charitable
foundation.' 2 79  The Attorney General's argument was that
'[i]nasmuch as JOCO is a charitable foundation, it is essentially
a trust as well as a non-stock corporation,"' and that the Attorney
General had the common law authority to act on behalf of the
public in such a case.""' Based on this theory, the Attorney Gen-
eral argued that the court had the power to remove the directors
and require an accounting "to ensure the funds are being distrib-
uted in a way that satisfies the charitable purposes set forth in
JOCO's original articles of incorporation."2"' The Attorney Gen-
eral also contended that the circuit court "'has inherent ancillary
authority' to award injunctive relief and appoint a receiver."2 2
The court disagreed, holding that the trial court was correct in
ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the issues
raised in the suit.28 3 There is no authority, reasoned the court, for
the Attorney General's argument "that a Virginia nonstock corpo-
ration devoted to charitable purposes 'essentially' is a charitable
trust.""2 4 As the court stated:
The Act, in Code § 13.1-860, sets forth detailed procedures for re-
moval of directors, and the General Assembly has not authorized the
Attorney General to participate in that exercise by prosecuting a suit
in an appropriate circuit court. Code § 13.1-861 permits any member
or director, not the Attorney General, to contest an election of direc-
tors in an appropriate circuit court. Code § 13.1-874 provides for re-
moval of officers of nonstock corporations, without any mention of
the participation of the Attorney General. Code §§ 13.1-884 through -
893 control the amendment of articles of incorporation, including
addition or deletion of provisions, under the supervision of the
Commission, without any participation in such reformation in a cir-
cuit court at the relation of the Attorney General.
285
278. Id. at 159, 558 S.E.2d at 283.
279. Id. (quoting the Attorney General's brief).
280. Id. (quoting the Attorney General's brief).
281. Id. at 159-60, 558 S.E.2d at 283-84.
282. Id. at 160, 558 S.E.2d at 284 (quoting the Attorney General's brief).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 161, 558 S.E.2d at 284.
285. Id. at 161-62, 558 S.E.2d at 285.
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Although the court recognized that a circuit court under Vir-
ginia law has 'full power to liquidate the assets and business of
the corporation at any time after the termination of corporate ex-
istence... upon the application of any person, for good cause,
with regard to any assets or business that may remain,""'2 6 the
court found that only the Commission may involuntarily termi-
nate the corporate existence of a Virginia nonstock corporation.2" 7
The court stated that the General Assembly has provided that
'[n o court within or without Virginia... shall have jurisdiction
to review, reverse, correct or annul any action of the Commission,
within the scope of its authority ... or to enjoin, restrain or inter-
fere with the Commission in the performance of its official du-
ties.""'28 Further, it held that "[i]f circuit courts, at the request of
the Attorney General, are to have subject matter jurisdiction over
claims like those made in the suit, the General Assembly has the
power to so provide."28 9 The court proceeded to find that JOCO
had been duly established by the Commission and was a lawful
and viable entity "with full power to operate within the authority
granted by the Commission."290 Therefore, under Virginia law, the
circuit court had no authority to terminate its existence involun-
tarily.291
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Lemons, joined by Justice
Koontz and Justice Kinser, argued that the circuit court should
have jurisdiction over the suit.292 Justice Lemons stated that the
flaw in the majority opinion was that it held "that the circuit
court would have jurisdiction over this action brought by the At-
torney General if the entity involved were a trust rather than a
corporation." '293 Justice Lemons contended that the critical factor
is the nature of the claim not the form of the entity involved in
the claim.294 According to his dissent, "[t]he public interest in the
286. Id. at 162, 558 S.E.2d at 285 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-909(B) (Repl. Vol.
1999)).
287. JOCO Found., 263 Va. at 162, 558 S.E.2d at 285; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
915 (Repl. Vol. 1999) (providing for involuntary termination of corporate existence).
288. JOCO Found., 263 Va. at 164, 558 S.E.2d at 286 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
813 (Repl. Vol. 1999)).
289. JOCO Found., 263 Va. at 164, 558 S.E.2d at 286.
290. Id. at 160, 558 S.E.2d at 284.
291. See id. at 162, 165, 558 S.E.2d at 285, 287.
292. Id. at 165, 558 S.E.2d at 287 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
293. Id. (Lemons, J., dissenting).
294. Id. (Lemons, J., dissenting).
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proper disposition of charitable assets is the same irrespective of
the form of the entity entrusted with the assets."295 Justice Lem-
ons argued that, at the very least, the Commission's jurisdiction
is not exclusive, even if it did have jurisdiction over some of the
claims in this action.296
C. Virginia Circuit Court Decision-Beck v. Virginia Sash &
Door, Inc.297
In Beck, the Richmond Circuit Court examined the issue of suc-
cessor liability among corporations.29 The two plaintiffs, John
Beck and Thomas Sizer, owned two Virginia companies, Virginia
Sash and Door, Inc. and Architectural Windows of Virginia,
Inc..299 In 1994, Kelmor, Inc., a Virginia corporation controlled by
two shareholders, Dan Kelley and Emmett Morgan, purchased
the assets of the companies. °° Subsequently, Kelmor renamed it-
self Virginia Sash and Door, Inc. ("Virginia Sash"), and operated
under the name Architectural Windows of Virginia. °1 As part of
the sale, Kelmor agreed to make monthly payments to the two
plaintiffs from 1996 until 2000 in return for non-compete and
consulting agreements.0 2
In 1999, Virginia Sash experienced problems making its pay-
ments to the plaintiffs as well as a debt owed to its bank, Wacho-
via Bank ("Wachovia").0 3 Wachovia, after informing Virginia
Sash that it wished to terminate its lending relationship with the
company, agreed to a "friendly foreclosure" with Virginia Sash.30 4
Under the agreement, Virginia Sash and/or Kelley and Morgan
intended to use a new corporation, funded with equity of $200,000
and a bank line of credit, to purchase Virginia Sash's assets.0 5
295. Id. (Lemons, J., dissenting).
296. Id. (Lemons, J., dissenting).
297. 58 Va. Cir. 65 (Richmond City 2001).
298. Id. at 67.
299. Id. at 65
300. Id.
301. Id.
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The result would be to pay off Wachovia and eliminate the debt
owed to the plaintiffs." 6
In September 2000, Wachovia conducted the foreclosure sale
and the new company formed by Kelley and Morgan, Architec-
tural Windows of Virginia Acquisition Corporation ("Architec-
tural Windows")," 7 submitted the only bid, which Wachovia ac-
cepted."' In addition, Architectural Windows also entered into a
purchase agreement with Virginia Sash through which it pur-
chased the assets not subject to the foreclosure sale.30 9 The plain-
tiffs brought suit against Architectural Windows alleging that it
was liable for the debt owed to them from Virginia Sash under
the theory of successor liability. °
Under Virginia law, a company that purchases another com-
pany's assets is generally not liable for the obligations of that
company, subject to four exceptions: (1) the buyer expressly or
impliedly agreed to take on such liabilities; (2) the circumstances
surrounding the transaction justify a finding that it was in fact a
de facto merger; (3) the buyer is a mere continuation of the seller;
or (4) the exchange is fraudulent in fact.311 In this instance, the
plaintiffs alleged that Architectural Windows was a mere con-
tinuation of Virginia Sash and therefore successor liability should
apply.1 2 The factors that the court examined to find successor li-
ability on the basis of mere continuation were: (1) inadequate
consideration; (2) substantial commonality of ownership, director-
ship and administration; (3) continuity of control; and (4) continu-
313ity of business. In this case, the court found all of these factors
present, noting that substantially all of the owners, officers, di-
rectors and shareholders of Virginia Sash were also owners, offi-
cers, directors, and shareholders of Architectural Windows and




309. Id. at 66-67.
310. Id. at 67.
311. Id. at 67-68 (citing Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States v. Clary
& Moore, 123 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 1997)).
312. Id. at 68; see also Harris v. T.I., Inc., 243 Va. 63, 413 S.E.2d 605 (1992).
313. Beck, 58 Va. Cir. at 68; see also Kaiser, 123 F.3d at 208.
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than adequate consideration. 4 In addition, the court found clear
continuity of business and control. 5
The court recognized, however, that in Virginia the finding of
"mere continuation" by a court is not sufficient to hold in favor of
the plaintiffs under the theory of successor liability because Vir-
ginia recognizes an exception to the "mere continuation" doctrine
where the purchase of all of the assets of a corporation is a bona
fide arm's-length transaction." 6 Here, Architectural Windows ar-
gued that such an exception should be found because the foreclo-
sure sale by Wachovia sanitized the transaction.1 7 In rejecting
this argument, the court held that although Wachovia initiated
the foreclosure, (1) Architectural Windows proposed the structure
of the deal; (2) Architectural Windows was the only bid; and (3)
the bid amount was almost the exact amount owed to Wacho-
via.31' Based on these facts, the court held that this was not an
arm's-length transaction; therefore, successor liability would be
imposed.1 9 Virginia Sash highlights the continued importance
that courts place on structuring arm's-length transactions to
avoid potential liability, particularly where there are continuing
officers, directors, and shareholders.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
INDEMNIFICATION AND EXCULPATION OF DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS
Although a comprehensive analysis is outside the scope of this
article, certain recent developments in federal legislation and se-
curities regulations merit mention. These developments, even ab-
sent any parallel Virginia legislative changes, may raise impor-
tant issues under Virginia corporate law. One issue that is
already attracting attention is the extent to which director and
officer indemnification and exculpation provisions found in the
VSCA32° and the articles of incorporation or bylaws of many Vir-
314. Id. at 69.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 69-70.
317. Id. at 69.
318. Id. at 70.
319. Id.
320. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-697 to -704 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
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ginia corporations will be applicable to actions taken by corporate
officials as required by such legislation and regulations.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the "Sarbanes-Oxley Act")321
and regulations adopted by the SEC implementing portions of
that statute322 mandate a number of actions by certain publicly-
held corporations or their specified officers and prohibit a variety
of other conduct.323 One variety of actions that has attracted a
great deal of attention is the requirement that the principal ex-
ecutive and financial officers of corporations subject to the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act personally make certifications as to the accuracy
and fair presentation of financial statements and other financial
information contained in certain periodic reports filed with the
SEC.324
Immediately upon the announcement of the new requirement,
the financial press and legal commentators highlighted the poten-
tial exposure of the signing officers to both civil liability and
criminal penalties arising from the required certifications.325
Without analyzing the accuracy of the SEC's statements that
the new certification regulations do not increase the likelihood or
expand the scope of potential personal liability,326 this prospect
quickly captured the attention of executives across the country.
One of the earliest questions asked of counsel after the new regu-
lations were proposed was: "Will the company's indemnification
provisions cover inadvertent incorrect certifications?
327
For Virginia corporations that have taken advantage of the lib-
eral standard for indemnification set forth in Virginia Code sec-
321. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
322. See, e.g., Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Se-
curity Holders, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,900 (Aug. 9, 2002); Certification of Disclosure in Compa-
nies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,276 (Sept. 9, 2002) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 240, 249, 270, 274).
323. See supra notes 321, 322.
324. Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 57,277.
325. See, e.g., Paul Beckett, Executives Face Harsh Sanctions in Corporate-Governance
Law, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2002, at C7; Bob Keefe, Will 'I Certify' Help Restore Credibility?
ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Aug. 11, 2002, at El; Gary Strauss, With Days to Go, Many Execs
Haven't Backed Results, USA TODAY, Aug. 12, 2002, at B2.
326. Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 57,285.
327. This article does not address the availability of indemnification and exculpation
provisions to officers and directors for conduct required by the new regulations.
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tion 13.1-704(B), the answer should be in the affirmative, because
an innocently made certification that turns out to be wrong would
not involve "willful misconduct or a knowing violation of the
criminal law."32 The same analysis and result should apply under
exculpation provisions based on section 13.1-692.1.329
V. CONCLUSION
While there were a number of significant judicial decisions af-
fecting Virginia corporate and business law this past year, the
pieces of legislation enacted by the General Assembly were more
substantial. The most significant legislation was the Virginia
Business Trust Act, which provides a statutory framework for the
formation and operation of Virginia business trusts. This struc-
ture will permit the Commonwealth of Virginia to compete more
effectively with those states that currently permit such flexible
entities. Also important in the continuing modernization of Vir-
ginia law is the fact that the General Assembly enacted several
important pieces of legislation that recognize the increased use of
electronic media such as e-mail and the Internet. Finally, of im-
portance in the judicial arena was the Virginia courts' recognition
of fiduciary duties in the L.L.C. context.
328. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-704(B) (Repl. Vol. 1999). Moreover, for inadvertent incorrect
certifications, there should be no underlying liability for the certifying officer under sec-
tion 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act because that section is limited to knowingly false certi-
fications. However, the officer's right to the advance of defense costs, under typical corpo-
rate indemnification provisions, will be important to enable the officer to defend against
claims of a violation.
329. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2002).
[Vol. 37:1
